Can Billy Hamilton's Legs Make Up for his Bat?

Photo Credit: Keith Allison

Billy Hamilton is having one of the strangest seasons I've ever seen.  He has been absolutely terrible at the plate.  Really, really bad.  Thus far, heading out of the All-Star break, he is hitting .220/.269/.287 with a 52 wRC+.  Compared to his 2014 season, when he was merely not good, he is making more contact (19% K rate in 2014, 15% in 2015).  However, this contact has been more often soft contact (22% Soft, 21% Hard in 2014, versus 23% Soft, 17% Hard contact in 2015) and he has been hitting slightly fewer ground balls (41.5% in 2014, 40% in 2015).  There have been times when I have been more confident in the pitcher's offense than in his, which doesn't happen very often with starting position players.

Remarkably, there are currently four qualified batters who have a lower wRC+ than Hamilton this year.

Alexei Ramirez, 43 wRC+, -1.0 WAR
Mike Zunino, 45 wRC+, -0.3 WAR
Chris Owings, 48 wRC+, -0.7 WAR
Omar Infante, 48 wRC+, -0.3 WAR
Billy Hamilton, 52 wRC+, +1.6 WAR

Ramirez and Infante, at least, have a history of being at least decent, if not plus, hitters for their positions.  Zunino is a catcher with a good defensive reputation.  Owings is a sophomore and former good prospect who has fallen on hard times.  If any of those guys don't pick up their offense in the second half, however, there's a good chance that they'll lose their starting position.  As a result, they won't achieve "qualified batters" status by the end of the season.

Going back 10 years (2005-2014), there are only five players who have managed a full season of playing time with a wRC+ lower than Hamilton's:

2006 Clint Barmes, 38 wRC+, -0.7 WAR
2010 Cesar Izturis, 46 wRC+, -0.4 WAR
2006 Ronny Cedeno, 48 wRC+, -1.8 WAR
2006 Angel Berroa, 48 wRC+, -1.5 WAR
2013 Alicedes Escobar, 49 wRC+, +1.1 WAR

(of note: Zack Cozart in 2014 had a 56 wRC+, +1.2 WAR)

Therefore, while Billy has been unquestionably bad at the plate, it hasn't quite risen to historical status.  The interesting thing to me about these two lists, beyond the magnitude of these hitters' offensive struggles, is that only two of them show up as having positive WAR: Alicedes Escobar and Billy Hamilton.  In both cases, the players' WAR totals are buoyed by strong baserunning numbers and strong fielding numbers.  There are those who will scoff at fielding data, but I can swallow that an elite defensive player like Escobar could still be worth 1 win above replacement.  That's still well below average, and not good.

Hamilton, though, currently has 1.6 WAR.  That puts him on pace for almost exactly 3 WAR, which would put him as a slightly above-average baseball player.  This is despite owning (if it doesn't improve) a batting line that would rank him 6th-worst since 2005.  Is that really possible, or is WAR broken when it comes to Hamilton?  Let's go component by component.

Hamilton's Baserunning

Perhaps more than any other ballplayer, Billy Hamilton's value comes on the basepaths.  While last year he was caught regularly, this year he has become far better at determining the best time to go.  Heading into last night's game, he had stolen 44 bases and been caught only 6 times, good for an 88% success rate.  That's Barry Larkin-level success rates, except that Larkin only topped 44 bases in one season.  Hamilton is on pace for 83 thefts.

And it's not just his basestealing.  Hamilton sails from first the third with ease, and scores from first on anything even remotely resembling an extra base (assuming he hasn't already stolen second).  He's been brilliant.

The two best baserunning totals since 2005 are Mike Trout in 2012 and Willy Taveras in 2008 (+14 runs each).  Hamilton is already 17th on that list at +10.6 runs, with 76 more games to play.  That puts him in really good position to be at the top of this list by the season's end.  He might even do that by the end of August.

Given everything we know about his actual baserunning abilities, I believe these numbers.  He's really special out there.  He might not reach +20 runs by the season's end (which he's currently on pace to do), but would anyone really be surprised if he posted the best baserunning season of the past decade at +15 runs or so?

Hamilton's Fielding

Thanks in large part to MLB's condensed games, I've been able to watch at least the meaningful plays of almost every Reds game this season.  The thing that has stuck out to me, even more so than Hamilton's baserunning, is his defense.  I can't count how many times I've seen a ball hit hard into the gap, cursed in anticipation of a double, only to see Billy somehow close on the ball and catch it running.  And then there are all those times when he's made those brilliant diving plays in shallow left-center.  He's wicked fast, and to my eye it seems like he takes good routes.  He's been amazing to watch.

Hamilton currently has +11 UZR, which is the fielding metric that FanGraphs uses in WAR.  That ranks him 37th among center fielders over the past decade+,  and 2nd this season behind Kevin Kiermaier.  He is one of only 6 center fielders to have made a play that Inside Edge classified as a "Remote Chance" play, ranks 3rd among CF's among plays ranked as "Unlikely," and 9th among CF's on balls judged as having an "About Even" chance to catch them.

Last year, Hamilton was a +22 UZR center fielder, which is what he's pacing right now.  The best center field seasons of the past decade have been in the 20-30 range, topped by Franklin Gutierrez's 2009 season at +34 runs.  I think most of those are probably overestimates high due to the volatility of fielding stats, but they were all very good fielding players (a young Andruw Jones, Coco Crisp, Carlos Gomez, Michael Bourn, Willy Taveras, etc).

Therefore, I think evaluating Hamilton as a +15-20 run fielder in center field is pretty fair.

Offense + Baserunning + Fielding + Position = WAR

Let's put it all together.

Offense: Hamilton is on pace for -32 batting runs above average.  Let's assume, for now, that he won't improve and go with that.

Baserunning: Let's assume +15 runs as a baserunner

Fielding: I'm going to be slightly conservative and put him as a +15 fielder.

Position: I'll give him the standard +2.5 runs/season bump for CF's, prorated down to +2.1 runs for 86% playing time (he misses games here and there with small injuries due to his playing style).

Replacement: I'll peg Replacement Level as -2.25 wins below average, which is about -20 runs vs. average on the season, prorated down to -17 runs due to playing time (using 9 runs per win).

So, if this is correct, it would be Billy's valuation at:

-32 (offense) + 15 (BsR) + 15 (fielding) + 2 (pos) + 17 (field) = +17 runs above average, or 1.9 WAR.

In other words, Hamilton rates out as almost exactly a league average player.  I'm not arguing he's a plus player, and he's definitely not an all-star.  Just that he's a unique, extreme, league-average ballplayer.  You can even argue that I'm being conservative.  Maybe he's a +20 run fielder.  And his rest of season projections have him about equal to his 2014 offensive performance than his miserable 2015 performance (ZiPS has him at .251/.301/.346 the rest of the way).  But league average feels about right to me.  I really don't think Hamilton is killing the Reds this year, especially not hitting 9th as Price is smartly deploying him.

I don't know how long this will last.  I worry that Hamilton's all-out play in the field and on the bases will slow him down over the coming couple of years.  And if he slows, I don't think his game is amenable to almost any kind of aging.  But for now, I think he's an acceptable starting outfielder.

And who knows?  Maybe he'll still learn to hit a little bit.  After all, even just taking a few more pitches, given the generally poor results when he actually swings, could really help his value.

Do fast runners protect hitters behind them?

One of the interesting insights that Joey Votto offered in Eno Sarris's interview at the end of March was the idea that having Billy Hamilton offered lineup protection.  This was a neat insight, and it makes sense: with Hamilton on first base, pitchers are more likely to throw fastballs to the batter to give their catchers a chance to throw them out, and certainly will avoid burying sliders and curveballs in the dirt.  That gives the batter a better shot at getting a good pitch to hit.

It does fly in the face of some past research, however.  In The Book, Tom Tango et al found that hitters actually hit WORSE with speedsters on first base than without.  Presumably, this effect was because they were distracted by the baserunner's antics as much as the pitcher would be.  There's on-the-field precedent for this as well: Joe Morgan famously demanded that runners hitting in front of him not steal bases while he was batting because of this distraction.  

So which is it?  Ben Lindbergh took another look at this yesterday...and found support for both arguments.  Sort of:

• Batters do see more fastballs with speedsters on first than with basecloggers on first (71% vs. 67%).  

• But despite seeing more fastballs, batters hit WORSE with speeders on first than with basecloggers (.273 TAv vs. .281 TAv)

Ben also pointed out that in The Book, they found that older batters were less distracted than younger batters.  So, hitting despite distractions might be something that can vary across hitters, and is something that hitters can learn to do.  Votto might be particularly good at it.  And really, if there's someone who would be good at this, it'd be Votto.

I might also expect, based on where their eyes are looking and their angle from the plate, that this distraction would be largest for righthanded hitters batting against left-handed pitchers.  Maybe if I get a play by play database running this summer with my Sabermetrics class, this might be something to look at!

Billy Hamilton running fast, but running into outs

Billy Hamilton loves to run.  But maybe
he loves it a little too much?
Photo Credit: Josh May

Edit: I wrote this post prior to Billy's hand injury in the first inning of tonight's game.  I thought about not publishing it, but early word is that it will only keep him out a few days.  Therefore, I figured I'd go ahead and post it.

Despite our hopes that he can become a multidimensional player, Billy Hamilton's calling card is his legs...and in particular, his ability to steal bases.  This season, however, while he already has 11 stolen bases, he also has been caught stealing 5 times, for a 69% success rate (though Wednesday night's game)

We've seen amazing things happen when he's on the bases.  When he's successful, Hamilton's speed can unquestionably transform innings.  But we've also seen scenarios this year where Billy has either gotten on base to lead off an inning, or entered as a pinch runner, and then immediately get thrown out.  What had been a promising inning is suddenly cut short before it can even begin.

The question with any base-stealer is whether his successes outweigh his failures.  One way that we can calculate this is to look at the linear weights values for baserunning.  On average, stolen bases have a linear weights value of +0.193 runs.  This means that, on average, a stolen base in an inning results in almost 0.2 more runs scored in that inning than in innings in which no stolen base occurred.  Billy has 11 stolen bases, so we can estimate that he has contributed 2.1 more runs with his steals than would be expected if he'd stayed on first base (or second base, as if often the case).

Each time a runner is caught stealing, however, it essentially kills an inning.  You had a runner on base, and now you have an out and no runner on base.  The average effect of a runner being caught stealing is to decrease the expected runs scored in an inning by 0.437 runs!  Billy has been caught stealing 5 times, so he's cost the Reds an estimated 2.2 runs this season.

Overall, this means that Billy's successes on the basepaths has been negated by his failures (+2.1 runs from SB's, but -2.2 runs from CS's).***   You can see these numbers on FanGraphs (albeit with slight differences).  Hamilton's wSB is +0.1 runs, indicating, again, that he has basically broken even thus far.

***We could break it down in a more nuanced fashion and take into account the outs and men on base in those innings, but this will be close to these values.  I'm also using linear weights that are based on 1974-1990 run environments, not 2013 environments, and so that will also change these values slightly.

The message is that Billy arguably needs to get better about picking his spots.  Everyone in the ballpark knows that he is running at almost every opportunity.  Under that scenario, even Hamilton is going to have a hard time doing any better than breaking even.

Three caveats:

1. Perhaps in response to this very issue, Billy just announced that he's going to try to slide head first more often.  This is apparently what he has done in the past in the minor leagues.  The evidence indicating that head first slides are faster than feet-first slides seems marginal at best.  But if he is more comfortable using that approach, it might result in better success rates.  Hopefully he is able to find a hand protector that works and prevents a Josh Hamilton-style injury.

2. Billy Hamilton's speed may have an additional effect, in that it may give Joey Votto the chance to see more hittable fastballs.  Here's a blurb from Eno Sarris's Joey Votto interview on this:

Protection, if it comes at all, might come from someone in front of him in the order. “The best lineup protection is when Billy Hamilton is on base in front of me, and it’s not about protection, it’s that I get a more predictable pitch to hit — fastball,” Votto said. We’ve seen how it takes a perfect throw home, pop, and throw back to second to catch Billy Hamilton, so we know that the pitcher would rather throw a fast pitch home. And knowing that will help Votto. 

You can make a very reasonable argument that as long as Billy is breaking even on the basepaths, this form of lineup protection for Joey Votto completely justifies his actions.  I'm cool with that.

3. Even if Billy's stolen base game isn't netting the Reds bonus runs on the basepaths (at least not yet), his prowess on the basepaths (going first to third, scoring from third, etc) has generated +1 run thus far.  It might seem like a low number given some of his heroics already this season.  But the argument is that, some of the time, Hamilton would have scored anyway even if he hadn't taken the extra base.

A Final Aside

Hall of Famer Barry Larkin was particularly efficient on the basepaths, stealing successfully in 379 of 456 attempts (83%).  In 1995, he swiped an absurd 51 out of 56 bases, which was worth 8 runs above average (+41.5 runs via the stolen base during his career!).  Man, that guy was good!

Why Steve Smith should keep being aggressive

When a runner is tagged out at home to make the first out
in an inning, everyone blames the third base coach.
But he might have made the right decision, and just
lost the bet.
Photo credit: Keith Allison

In the aftermath of today's loss to the Rays, Reds third base coach Steve Smith beat himself up over his decision to send Joey Votto home with no outs.  Votto was tagged out, and ultimately the team lost 1-0.  His quote:

"I can't get a guy thrown out with no outs, and I understand that," Smith said. "I tried to be too aggressive at the wrong time. I got burned. ... I've got to play the game. I got aggressive. If the ball bounces one way or the other, then everybody doesn't know about it. It's no outs. I always assume a guy makes a great throw, and he did. I take full credit for that."

I think Steve Smith isn't looking at this the right way.  The fact that Votto was thrown out does NOT mean that he made the wrong decision in that spot.  He may have just lost on what was a good bet.

A few years ago, Pizza Cutter wrote an article titled "Why All Third-Base Coaches Should Be Fired."  In it, he noted that, based on success rates, third-base coaches seem to be far too conservative.  He noted that in sacrifice fly situations, runners that attempted to run home were successful 96% of the time.  That's despite the enormous gains that a team receives when a runner scores.

Let's try to repeat Pizza's math for the situation with Votto.  Pizza didn't explain his math, but I think the following is right.  We have three possible outcomes:

1. What happened: Joey goes for it, gets thrown out.  That leaves the Reds with a runner on second (Phillips) and one out.  The average run expectancy in that case is 0.637 runs
2. Joey goes for it, but scores!  That leads to 1 run (Votto's), plus Phillips went on the throw and thus is now at second base with no outs.  That gives us an extra run expectancy of 1.0499, for a total of 2.0499 runs.
3. Joey holds at third on the single, giving the Reds 1st & 3rd with no one out.  Average run expectancy there is 1.6423 runs.

So, we want to find the break-even percentage of success at which point Votto should be sent.  That percentage, x, would make the average value of sending the runner equivalent to having him stay at third.  Therefore, any success rate over that percentage means you should send him, even if there is some chance that he is thrown out.  (warning, a little algebra ahead...you can skip if you'd prefer to do so)

I solved this equation for x: 

Runs_Hold = Runs_Success*x + Runs_Failure*(1-x) 

Which would be:
1.6423 = 2.0499*x + .637*(1-x) 

So:
1.6423 = 2.0499*x + 0.637 - 0.637x 

...simplying...
1.0053 = 1.4129x
x = 0.71

What this means is that if Steve Smith is more than 71% certain--let's say 75%--that Votto will score on that play, he should send him.  Even though there were no outs in the inning.  Yes, one out of four times, he'll get burned--just as he did tonight.  But he should be playing the percentages.  The Reds stand to gain more over the long haul by sending runners in that situation whenever the coach thinks they will succeed three out of four times.  The one in four chance might be that "great throw" that Smith cites in his statement.

It's probably worth mentioning that this play comes only days after Billy Hamilton's amazing feat of scoring from third on a pop fly barely past the second baseman's position.  Smith presumably was in on that, and looked like a genius.  This time, he got burned.  But I hope he continues to be aggressive on sending runners home in the future.

Celebrating Billy Hamilton's Day

Billy Hamilton had a great day today at the plate:

Quite a relief given how much of a struggle it has been for the guy in the early goings.  Even more impressive, however, was how two of those four times on base led to runs.  Jeff Sullivan gives a delightful retelling of Billy's 5th inning hijinks.  

The steal:

It’s important to note that the Cardinals’ catcher was Yadier Molina. It’s important to note that Molina didn’t even fake an attempt of a throw. Billy Hamilton took off against the best defensive catcher in baseball, and the best defensive catcher in baseball was like, “welp.”

Jay Bruce's Sac "Fly" (Sac Pop-Up?)

Jay Bruce hit a pop-up the second baseman could’ve caught. Bruce got credit for a sac fly and an RBI. With literally anybody else in the game, Bruce would’ve returned to the dugout knowing he’d screwed up. He still knew he screwed up, but that’s one of the things about Hamilton — he can erase other people’s mistakes. Billy Hamilton, by himself, turned Jay Bruce’s negative into a positive.
You’re looking at probably one of the most shallow sac flies in baseball history. It’s hard to imagine a sac fly more shallow. Let’s look at the most shallow sac flies from 2013, shall we? We’ll move in chronological order. These are the sac flies hit to what were considered infield zones.

Hamilton could very well go 0 for his next 15 again. But I'm hopeful that this is the first sign we get this season of what could be a really fun year watching him fly down the basepaths.